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Defining Dysfunction: Natural Selection,
Design, and Drawing a Line*
Peter H. Schwartz†‡
Accounts of the concepts of function and dysfunction have not adequately explained
what factors determine the line between low-normal function and dysfunction. I call
the challenge of doing so the line-drawing problem. Previous approaches emphasize
facts involving the action of natural selection (Wakefield 1992a, 1999a, 1999b) or the
statistical distribution of levels of functioning in the current population (Boorse 1977,
1997). I point out limitations of these two approaches and present a solution to the
line-drawing problem that builds on the second one.
A Case. Mr. Smith is a 70-year-old man being admitted to the hospital
with congestive heart failure (CHF). He had a heart attack a few years
ago, followed by a procedure that reopened a blocked coronary artery.
He did well since then, and tests showed that his “ejection fraction,” the
amount of blood his heart pushes out in each contraction, remained
around 50%, down from the average of 60% but still in the normal range.
Over the last few weeks, he has developed increasing shortness of breath,
and tests show that his ejection fraction has dropped to 20%. This re-
duction in his heart’s pumping ability is causing fluid to leak out of the
veins in his lungs, causing his trouble breathing. Possible causes of his
heart failure range from another heart attack to valvular problems or
other issues.
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1. Introduction. Mr. Smith’s heart has gone from pumping blood com-
pletely normally, to pumping below average but within the normal range,
after his first heart attack, to pumping inadequately. His doctors diagnose
him with congestive heart failure, and he now counts as having a disease.
Looked at biologically, his heart is dysfunctional since it is failing to carry
out its proper function of pumping blood.1
Mr. Smith’s heart has crossed a line, from being normal, healthy, and
properly functioning, to being abnormal, diseased, and dysfunctional. I
will argue that the line between properly functioning and dysfunctioning
is poorly understood, and I will call the challenge of providing an adequate
account of this distinction the line-drawing problem. The problem is im-
portant, first, since it raises an issue that has been overlooked in the debate
over “function” and teleology more generally in philosophy of biology.
Second, in medical ethics and philosophy of medicine, the problem poses
a challenge to certain important definitions of “disease,” which rely on
criteria involving dysfunction.
I’ll start, in Section 2, by explaining why the line-drawing problem is
relevant to analyzing the biological concept of function in biology. In
Section 3 through Section 5, I examine two definitions of “disease,” pre-
sented by Christopher Boorse (1977, 1987, 1997) and Jerome Wakefield
(1992a, 1992b, 1999a, 1999b), which both make dysfunction necessary to
the presence of disease in an organism. Although these theorists have not
formulated the line-drawing problem as I do here, in the process of spelling
out their accounts each has suggested a possible approach. I will examine
their proposals and argue that they fall short in instructive ways. In Section
6, I propose my own approach, building on Boorse’s.
2. Function and Line Drawing. The concept of dysfunction has been gen-
erally ignored by philosophers writing about function (two exceptions are
Neander [1995] and Boorse [1977, 1997]). Theorists have focused, instead,
on the question of which of an item’s many effects or possible effects
count as its function. The heart, for instance, pumps blood, makes noise,
generates heat, and burns glucose, but only pumping blood counts as its
function. The worry has been that picking out some effect as the function
involves problematic teleological ideas or occurs as part of illegitimate
attempts at teleological explanation.
Philosophers have responded by proposing definitions of “function”
1. For the purposes of this paper, I will treat the terms “dysfunctional” and “dys-
functioning” interchangeably. And while I believe these terms are also interchangeable
with “malfunctional” and “malfunctioning,” I will avoid the latter two for simplicity’s
sake. There may be those who believe there are important and systematic differences
between these terms, but I believe this is questionable.
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based on scientific, nonteleological notions and by describing types of
explanations where function ascriptions can play legitimate roles. One
major approach in philosophy of biology has been the “etiological view,”
where an item’s proper function is (roughly) the effect that was favored
by natural selection (e.g., Millikan 1989; Neander 1991). Nonetiological
accounts, in contrast, argue that there is no need to invoke natural se-
lection and instead utilize other causal and statistical notions (e.g., Boorse
1976; Cummins 1975).
None of these theories have focused on the line-drawing problem. But
drawing the line between normal and abnormal levels of pumping blood,
for instance, raises the same teleological worries as the question of why
pumping, rather than other effects of the heart, counts as its function.
Just as highlighting one of the heart’s effects as its function raises the
worry that a judgment is being made about what the heart “should do”
(or about its “purpose,” etc.), so does picking out one level of pumping
as normal. A heart that beats with an EF of 50% is doing what hearts
“should do,” while one that beats with an EF of 20% is failing to do so.
Once again, teleological ideas may be creeping into the description of the
heart.
The same questions arise in analyzing the central biological idea of
“normal variation.” A generally accepted principle of modern biology is
that there is no single design for any species, but instead a normal range
of variation for almost every trait. Even among healthy 70-year-old men,
for instance, there is a large range in the ability of hearts to pump. People
who run marathons have very efficient hearts, reflected in their EF and
other features, while those who rarely exercise have much less efficient
hearts. But there are boundaries to this normal range: below a certain
level of functioning, the heart counts as abnormal. Making sense of “nor-
mal variation” requires solving the line-drawing problem as well.
3. Dysfunction-Requiring Accounts of Disease.
3.1. Advantages of Dysfunction-Requiring Accounts. Of the function
theorists, Christopher Boorse (1977, 1987, 1997) has confronted the line-
drawing problem most directly, in his attempt to use the notion of dys-
function to present a value-free definition of “disease.” Jerome Wakefield
(1992a, 1992b, 1999a, 1999b) has more recently presented a definition of
“disease” that also includes a criterion involving dysfunction, and this
leads him to suggest an approach to the line-drawing problem as well,
although a less developed one than Boorse’s.
The “dysfunction-requiring” (DR) theories of disease, as I will call
them, form a small subset of the many definitions that have been put
forward, and the DR view is interesting partly because it avoids serious
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problems that other approaches face. For instance, Culver and Gert (1982,
81), define a “malady” as a condition that causes a person to be “suffering,
or at increased risk of suffering, an evil (death, pain, disability, loss of
freedom or opportunity, or loss of pleasure) in the absence of a distinct
sustaining cause”. But this definition would make pregnancy a malady,
as the authors later accept (Gert, et al. 1997, 126). Also, since certain
desires or beliefs may increase one’s risk of suffering an “evil”—e.g.,
perhaps a desire to climb a mountain, or a belief that the government in
power is up to no good—Culver and Gert (1982) include a specific con-
dition ruling out rational beliefs or desires from being maladies. But this
way of solving the problem seems horribly ad hoc.
DR theories of disease count none of these conditions—wanting to
climb a mountain, being pregnant, distrusting the government, etc.—as
diseases since none of them involve biological dysfunction.2 It is partly
because of these advantages that Boorse’s account serves as the basis for
one of the best worked-out accounts of the ethics of healthcare distribution
(Daniels 1985; see also Buchanan et al. 2000, Chapters 3–4).
3.2. Two Theories. Here are the two DR accounts I will discuss. Boorse
calls his approach the “Biostatistical Theory” and states it recently as
follows:
1. The reference class is a natural class of organisms of uniform func-
tional design; specifically, an age group of a sex of a species.
2. A normal function of a part or process within members of the ref-
erence class is a statistically typical contribution by it to their in-
dividual survival and reproduction.
3. A disease is a type of internal state which is either an impairment
of normal functional ability, i.e., a reduction of one or more func-
tional abilities below typical efficiency, or a limitation on functional
ability caused by environmental agents.
4. Health is the absence of disease. (Boorse 1997, 7–8)
Wakefield presents his “Harmful Dysfunction Account” (HD) as follows:
A condition is a disorder if and only if (a) the condition causes some
harm or deprivation of benefit to the person as judged by the stan-
dards of the person’s culture (the value criterion), and (b) the con-
dition results from the inability of some internal mechanism to per-
2. DR theories, of course, have problems of their own, and I cannot attempt to address
them here. For some of the strongest defenses, see Boorse (1997) and Wakefield (1992a,
1999a, 1999b).
368 PETER H. SCHWARTZ
form its natural function, wherein a natural function is an effect that
is part of the evolutionary explanation of the existence and structure
of the mechanism (the explanatory criterion). (1992a, 384)
There are a few similarities and differences between the two theories
to note immediately. First, they vary in their choice of terms—Boorse
uses “disease” and Wakefield “disorder”—but both writers specify that
they are aiming at all pathological conditions (Boorse 1997, 11; Wakefield
1999a, 376). I’ll concentrate on cases of physical illness, and I’ll switch
between the three terms—“disease,” “disorder,” and “pathology”—freely.
Second, while Wakefield considers the presence of dysfunction to be a
necessary condition for the presence of disease, Boorse treats it as both
necessary and sufficient. This difference will not matter to the discussion
here, since reliance on a notion of dysfunction in either way raises the
line-drawing problem.
Third, Boorse and Wakefield base their definitions of “dysfunction” on
different accounts of function, since Boorse’s account (in Premise 2) re-
quires just a typical contribution to survival and reproduction, while
Wakefield requires that the trait was favored by natural selection. This
difference will not matter to my discussion of cases like Mr. Smith’s heart
failure, in the analysis of the line-drawing problem, since both approaches
assign the human heart the function of pumping blood.
Finally, Boorse and Wakefield both offer their accounts as conceptual
analysis. Because of this orientation, each formulates his definition as a
short list of necessary and sufficient criteria, and each argues that his
definition fits with medical opinion and other intuitions about what is a
disease, using a wide range of real and imagined cases. There are various
problems with this way of framing the debate (cf. Ramsey 1992), but I’ll
play by the same rules here. For further discussion, see Section 7, below.
It’s important to note also that Boorse and Wakefield both reject any
quick inference from the disease-status of a condition to any conclusion
about whether it should be treated or not (e.g., Boorse 1997, 11–13;
Wakefield 1999a, 374). While both view medicine as having a particular
interest in treating and preventing diseases, they agree it may be best to
treat some nondiseases and not treat some diseases. Following them and
others, I will focus on the analysis of concepts of disease and dysfunction,
avoiding conclusions about the advisability of medical interventions.3
3. One view that treats the disease-status of a condition as relevant to its treatment
by medical professionals, without making disease-status necessary or sufficient for such
treatment, is the “Primary Rationale for Medical Obligations” view (Buchanan et al.
2000, 121–124).
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4. Wakefield’s Approach.
4.1. Wakefield’s Approach to the Line-Drawing Problem. The essence
of Wakefield’s approach to the line-drawing problem involves his “ex-
planatory criterion,” which requires that “the condition results from the
inability of some internal mechanism to perform its natural function”
(1992a, 384). The simplest way to interpret this would be as requiring
true inability, i.e., that the organ has no capacity to carry out its function
at all. But that can’t be right, since Mr. Smith’s heart is dysfunctioning,
and yet it is still pumping, just at a radically decreased level.
Wakefield needs to provide some other account of what “inability”
means. He makes a number of comments on this topic, mostly invoking
the idea of design. He writes, “Roughly, we recognize a variation in an-
atomical structure as a lesion rather than as a normal variation if the
variation impairs the ability of the particular structure to accomplish the
functions that it was designed to perform” (1992a, 375, emphasis added).
In another paper, he writes, “A dysfunction exists when a person’s internal
mechanisms are not able to function in the range of environments for
which they were designed” (1992b, 243).
He makes it clear that he means “design” in these contexts as referring
to the action of natural selection. He writes that dysfunction is “. . .
‘failure of a mechanism in the person to perform a natural function for
which the mechanism was designed by natural selection’” (1992b, 236).
Later, he writes, “. . . it is standard among evolutionary theorists to use
design, purpose, goal, and other intentional metaphors to describe the
results of natural selection” (1999a, 376).
This last comment underestimates the magnitude of the controversy
over the use of such metaphors in biology. On one side, some philosophers
of biology argue that because living things are not actually “designed,”
the term can apply only metaphorically (e.g., Lewontin 1983; Matthen
1997). Others hold that organisms are literally designed by natural selec-
tion, although in a different sense of “design” than when the term refers
to manmade artifacts (e.g., Allen and Bekoff 1995).4 We can sidestep this
dispute by noting that on either view, if “design” means anything sub-
stantial in a biological context, it refers in some way to natural selection.5
And for both views the absence of an intentional designer in natural
selection blocks any simple inference from “natural design” to “intentional
design.”
4. It’s not easy to classify Dennett (1995) as falling in either of these camps: although
he extensively defends the idea that Natural Selection designs living things, he com-
monly puts “design” in scare quotes in this context.
5. Lewens (2004, especially Chapter 1) makes a similar observation.
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In his comments that apply directly to the line-drawing problem, Wake-
field writes that natural selection favors a “range of responses” in organ-
isms (1999a, 379), and he argues that “a range of selected values can be
distinguished from nonselected values and this is all that is required for
the HD analysis to discriminate disorder from nondisorder” (1999a, 387).6
So, the existence of wide variation in functioning, such as in hearts’ pump-
ing ability, does not pose a problem for his theory, he writes, since only
some levels were favored by selection, while others were selected against.
Discussing the example of panic attacks, he writes, “there is a naturally
selected range of the sensitivity of fear-response mechanisms, but the
spontaneous terrors of panic disorder are not part of that range” (1999a,
387).
4.2. Problems for Wakefield’s Approach. But this approach does not
solve the line-drawing problem. The first difficulty is that for acquired
disorders, ones not caused genetically, natural selection does not apply.
For example, it is not the case that Mr. Smith’s EF of 20% is favored by
natural selection or not favored, since his condition is not hereditary.
Maybe Wakefield would recommend that we identify some cutoff for
“heart failure” by drawing an analogy to hereditary heart problems, such
as congenital heart malformations. Perhaps there is some ejection fraction
that is low enough that we can confidently conclude that natural selection
would discriminate against individuals born with that EF.
But this approach leads to the second, and deeper, problem with Wake-
field’s proposal. Deciding whether a certain variant is selected against
depends on which other forms exist in the population. If a certain he-
reditary condition causes children at birth to have an EF of 20%, and
only 1% of these children will survive to reproduce, this genetic variant
will still be favored by selection compared to conditions carrying a 0.5%
chance of survival. Consider the following imaginary case of five variants
with their associated levels of expected reproduction: Which ones count
as being “selected for” and which are “selected against”?
Variant Expected Reproduction
A .2
B .5
C 1
D 2
E 5
6. This in response to criticism from Lilienfeld and Marino (1995, 414), who point
out that there is no single level of functioning that is favored by natural selection. My
point here is meant to build on theirs.
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Variants B–E are selectively favored in comparison to A, and variants A–
D are selected against in comparison to E. It’s tempting to count just
variant A as the pathological one, since it has the lowest expected repro-
duction, but variant B also has very low fitness and thus might be taken
as falling outside the normal range. And if we count B as outside the
normal range, we might want to count C as selected against as well.
Finally, if we discover another variant that is incompatible with life (ex-
pected reproductionp 0), does this mean that even variant A falls in the
normal range?
Similar reasoning applies to the case of panic disorder: there may be
a range in “the sensitivity of fear-response mechanisms,” as Wakefield
says (1999a, 387), and if these are hereditary there may be a fitness as-
sociated with each. But there is no line here that can discriminate between
which ones are naturally selected and which are not, despite Wakefield’s
confidence (1999a, 387). Something other than the existence of positive
or negative selection must be used to solve the line-drawing problem.7
4.3. Design and Artifacts. Determining whether a manmade artifact is
dysfunctioning often depends on facts about the designer’s intentions, and
it is the absence of such intentions in the case of organisms “designed”
by natural selection that sinks Wakefield’s approach to the line-drawing
problem. For example, consider my laser printer. Laser printers on the
market today display a great variety in resolution, printing speed, du-
rability, and ability to print on papers of different sizes and weights. Since
my printer is a low-cost one meant for home offices, it does relatively
poorly on all these measures. But for now it is in perfect working order,
since it is operating exactly as planned.
Even among printers of the same make and model, there will be some
variation in performance due to factors such as how well certain parts
were welded together or lubricated. For example, imagine that printers
of my make and model coming out of the factory may print anywhere
from 12 pages per minute (ppm) to eight pages per minute. What deter-
mines which levels of printing are normal—and what tolerance among
the printer’s parts are acceptable—involves the printer’s specifications (set
by the manufacturer), the promises made in advertising, and the under-
standing of the general purchaser. These are exactly the sort of factors
that are completely absence in the case of “design” by natural selection.
Although the analogy between design by humans and by natural selection
may be helpful in some ways, relying on it to solve the line-drawing
problem cannot work.
7. Boorse (2002, 101–102) makes a related point.
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5. Boorse’s Proposal.
5.1. Premises 1 and 2. Boorse’s articles (1977, 1987, 1997) suggest a
different approach to the line-drawing problem, although he doesn’t focus
on the issue either. Consider his four-part definition of “disease,” above
(Section 3.1), starting with his idea of a “reference class” in Premise 1.
According to this premise, a trait-token’s level of functioning is compared
against the trait-tokens of other individuals of the same gender and age.
The discussion of Mr. Smith’s heart failure, above (Sections 2 and 4.2),
already implicitly assumed this, since his heart’s pumping ability was
compared to that of other 70-year-old men, not of young adults or women,
for instance.
Reference classes are necessary because of the variability among age
groups and between the two genders. In humans, the female breast has
the function of producing milk at certain times, for example, while the
male breast never does. Human children younger than 6 months old can’t
walk and newly hatched chicks can’t fly, but their legs and wings (re-
spectively) do not count as dysfunctional. As individuals age, the level of
functioning considered normal declines: a certain EF may count as normal
in an 80-year-old when it would be abnormal in a 20-year-old. Even
cessation of function may be normal, like menopause in a 50-year-old
woman. Menopause at younger ages, termed “premature ovarian failure,”
is not normal.
Boorse states his theory of function in Premise 2. One small modifi-
cation in his theory is necessary to allow it to apply to older individuals,
such as Mr. Smith. According to Premise 2, the hearts of 70-year-old men
only have the function of pumping blood if that is the “statistically typical
contribution” of these trait-tokens to “individual survival and reproduc-
tion” (1997, 7). But since men at this age generally have finished repro-
ducing, it may turn out that hearts in this reference class make no con-
tribution to reproduction and thus, formally, make no contribution to
“survival and reproduction.” Simply changing the conjunction to dis-
junction resolves this problem: a trait-type’s function is its statistically
typical contribution to “survival or reproduction.”8
5.2. The Frequency Approach. Premise 3 presents Boorse’s definition
of disease, treating the term as basically synonymous with “dysfunction.”
So the key to answering the line-drawing problem for Boorse is deciding
8. Note that while this change helps Boorse’s theory here, it may raise problems for
his account of functions in other areas by making it even more permissive than it
already is. For example, a trait that extends survival slightly by interfering with suc-
cessful reproduction may be counted as having the function of doing so.
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Figure 1. Adapted from Boorse (1987, 370; 1997, 8). (I’ve reversed the axes, to place
them as Boorse initially intended [personal communication] and in keeping with the
standard practice of placing the dependent variable on the Y-axis.)
when there is “an impairment of normal functional ability, i.e., a reduction
of one or more functional abilities below typical efficiency” (Boorse 1997,
7–8).9
One possible interpretation of “below typical efficiency” will definitely
not work, i.e., taking it as anything falling below mean (or median) ef-
ficiency. This would make all organs functioning below average count as
dysfunctional and that can’t be right. As Boorse says, a condition is a
dysfunction only if it “falls more than a certain distance below the pop-
ulation mean” (1977, 559; emphasis added). And this raises the line-
drawing problem again: How far is far enough?
The little Boorse says about this topic centers on a graph of “Efficiency
of part-function” vs. “Statistical distribution in reference class” (1987,
370; 1997, 8), reproduced with some modifications in Figure 1. He assumes
that the distribution is statistically normal and writes that the cutoff
between low-normal function and dysfunction “can only be convention-
ally chosen, as in any application of statistical normality to a continuous
distribution. The precise line between health and disease is usually aca-
demic, since most diseases involve functional deficits that are unusual by
any reasonable standard” (1977, 559). In a later paper, he writes, “[T]he
lower limit of normal functional ability—the line between normal and
pathological—is arbitrary. Although statisticians often use . . . [a] 95
percent central range, no reason for such a choice applies here. The con-
9. The last phrase of Premise 3, which says that a trait is dysfunctional if it is “a
limitation on functional ability caused by environmental agents,” (Boorse 1997, 8) will
only be relevant for cases of unusually prevalent diseases, discussed below (Section
5.3, FN’s 12 and 13).
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cept of a pathological state has vague boundaries—though the vast ma-
jority of disease processes involve functional deficits by any reasonable
standard” (1987, 371). Interpreting these comments, and thus Boorse’s
approach to the line-drawing problem, requires some care.
First, Boorse writes that the line is “conventionally chosen” or “arbi-
trary.”10 That said, he clearly does not mean that the line could be drawn
anywhere, since this would imply relativism about disease-status, which
Boorse clearly rejects. For example, even if we want our children to be
taller, it would be a mistake to say that a child in the sixtieth percentile
for height suffers from “dwarfism.” Only certain places to draw the edge
of normality are acceptable.
Second, Boorse mentions the existence of “functional deficits” as con-
firming the judgment that a condition is a disease. But such deficits are
not necessary, as we can see from his comment that just a “majority” or
“vast majority” of diseases have them. And if there are deficits, they need
not be noticeable at a tissue or organismic level. He writes: “Local part-
dysfunctions need not have any gross effects on disability or deformity
or distress. . . . Liver cells, to be normal, must perform a host of metabolic
functions because that is what liver cells collectively contribute to survival
and reproduction. But a large number of liver cells can be pathological
without clinically detectable effects or appreciable risk of such effects”
(1987, 371–372). In fact, one of the strengths of Boorse’s theory is that
it makes disease-status independent of facts about whether the condition
carries undesirable consequences for the organism. This independence
helps the theory avoid the problems that plague non-DR theories such
as those emphasizing harm (see Section 3.1).
Finally, although Boorse says that there is nothing inviolate about the
“95 percent central range” around average, he does give statistical mea-
sures primacy. He writes, “health is normal functioning, where the nor-
mality is statistical and the functions biological” (1977, 542). He empha-
sizes the importance of statistics when he calls his account the
“Biostatistical theory” and says that “disease is only statistically species-
subnormal biological part-function” (1997, 4). Note also that the graph
in Figure 1 just represents the prevalence of each level of function, without
providing any information about the consequences of each level.
I’ll call the view that Boorse appears to embrace the Frequency approach
to the line-drawing problem. According to this approach, the range of
acceptable places to draw a line between low-normal and dysfunction is
determined by statistical measures of the distribution of levels of func-
tioning in the reference class. For example, if there is a normal distribution
10. Wakefield says something similar, writing that for concepts such as disorder,
“boundaries are set partly by convention” (1999a, 379).
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of levels, then the line must be drawn near two standard deviations below
the mean. The exact location can be chosen arbitrarily as long as it falls
in this area.
5.3. The Problem of Common Disease. The first challenge for the fre-
quency approach can be described again using Mr. Smith’s case of heart
failure. The relevant graph in this case is Ejection Fraction (EF) on the
X-axis and prevalence among 70-year-old men on the Y-axis. Assuming
that Mr. Smith’s EF of 20% falls more than two standard deviations
below the mean—placing him in the bottom 1% of members of his ref-
erence class, say—then the Frequency approach properly classifies his
heart as dysfunctional. But the approach also implies that if an EF of
20% were more prevalent, say found in 10% or 20% of the population,
then it would not count as dysfunction or disease. And this would be so
even if all these people felt the same negative consequences as Mr. Smith.
I’ll call this the problem of common disease.
At first blush, this might sound similar to some well-known critiques
of Boorse that use examples of common disease, which emphasize that a
nonetiological account of function like his has trouble explaining how a
trait-type continues to have the function F in situations where all (or
almost all) trait-tokens fail to do F (Millikan 1989, 300; Neander 1991,
182–183). The challenge posed by the problem of common disease is
different, however, for a number of reasons. First, it arises in cases where
function is reduced, not lost. Second, the problem arises even if only a
significant minority of individuals in the reference class (e.g., 20% or 30%)
have decreased function. Third, the problem of common diseases faces
both etiological and nonetiological accounts of function, i.e., any theory
that adopts the frequency approach for distinguishing between normal
and abnormal.
Finally and perhaps most importantly, there are no actual cases of
universal disease (as far as I’m aware), and there are plenty of real-life
cases of common disease. For example, in dogs the prevalence of serious
dysfunction of the hip joint, termed “canine hip dysplasia” has been
estimated at more than 30% in some breeds (Rettenmaier et al. 2002). In
humans, there are many prevalent dysfunctions, especially in the elderly.
For example, serious urinary dysfunction due to Benign Prostatic Hy-
pertrophy (BPH) occurs in more than 17% of men over 70 (Bosch et al.
1995),11 and senility of the Alzheimer’s type has a prevalence of 16% in
people over 85 years old (Polvikoski et al. 2001).
11. These numbers for prevalence are calculated using some of the most restrictive
possible definitions of BPH. Less demanding definitions yield prevalences as high as
28% in this age group (Bosch et al. 1995, 38).
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At the end of Premise 3, Boorse adds a codicil that allows a prevalent
condition to count as a disease, i.e., if it is “a limitation on functional
ability caused by environmental agents” (1997, 8). This criterion is meant
to handle cases of universal disease, where a virus or toxin becomes com-
mon.12 But it will not help explain why BPH and Alzheimer’s, or hip
dysplasia in dogs, count as diseases, since there is no clear environmental
cause for their prevalence.13
5.4. The Problem of Healthy Populations. The second major problem
facing the Frequency approach arises if we think about reference classes
where dysfunction is incredibly rare. Imagine, for instance, that EF in 20-
year-old men ranged just from 50% to 70%, and physicians thus did not
diagnose any men at this age with congestive heart failure. In such a case,
the Frequency approach implies that as long as there is a normal distri-
bution of functional abilities, the lowest 1–2% must count as dysfunc-
tional. The problem of healthy populations, as I’ll call it, arises in any case
where a trait’s lowest level of functioning in some reference class is not
low enough to be dysfunctional.
Wakefield’s definition of “disorder” avoids the problem since his first
criterion says that a condition only counts as a disorder if it causes harm.
Thus, in our imaginary population of healthy 20-year-olds, the ones with
an EF below the first percentile in pumping efficiency won’t count as
having a disorder since their lower-than-average EF causes them no harm.
That said, the puzzle remains why they should count as having a dys-
function at all, i.e., as fulfilling Wakefield’s second criterion for disorder.
And if Wakefield were to adopt the Frequency approach to defining dys-
function, he would still have to address the problem of common disease.
6. The Frequency and Negative Consequences (FNC) Approach.
6.1. A Proposal. The problem of common disease and the problem of
healthy populations show that there is more variability in the prevalence
of dysfunction than the Frequency approach allows. What appears to be
needed is an additional factor, and a natural candidate is the effect that
a given level of functioning has on the organism. For example, in the
problem of healthy populations, it is the lack of negative consequences
12. Note that the condition does nothing to explain why the trait-type in such cases
should count as still having the function F at all, since it no longer makes any con-
tribution to survival or reproduction. Answering that problem requires interpretation
or modification of Premise 2.
13. Boorse (2002, 103) has recently discussed dropping this additional clause from
Premise 3, due to a variety of challenges it faces.
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of having an EF of 50% that makes this level of pumping appear to be
low-normal, rather than dysfunctional, even though it falls in the bottom
1% of the reference class. In the problem of common disease, the presence
of important negative consequences is what makes serious BPH or Alz-
heimer’s appear to be dysfunctional, even though the conditions are so
prevalent.
One way to introduce a role for facts about negative consequences is
to add a third dimension to the sort of graphs used in the Frequency
approach. In addition to the X-axis showing the level of functioning and
the Y-axis showing prevalence, one can add a Z-axis representing the
magnitude of negative consequences imposed by the functional level. The
role for the magnitudes displayed on the Z-axis would be the following.
More severe negative consequences would support moving the line be-
tween normal and abnormal (on the X-axis) toward the right, to count
more levels of functioning as dysfunctional. A lack of negative conse-
quences would support moving the line to the left, to count only lower
levels of functioning (or even no levels of functioning at all) as dysfunc-
tional. This method presents no simple rule about where to put the line,
but it provide a role for judgments about consequences, and thus a way
to answer the problems facing the Frequency approach.14 Call this the
Frequency and Negative Consequences (FNC) approach.
Consider the problem of common disease, such as BPH in 70-year-old
men or Alzheimer’s in 85-year-old men or women. In these cases, the
negative consequences would support moving the line between low-normal
and dysfunctional on the X-axis to the right. Similarly, the serious effect
of canine hip-dysplasia on ambulation would support considering the
lowest 30% of the breed as having dysfunctional hips. In the sort of case
that arises in the problem of healthy populations, the lack of negative
consequences of having an EF of 50% would support moving the line
between normal and abnormal to the left on the X-axis. Thus an EF of
50% might well count as normal even though its prevalence is 1% in the
reference class.
The FNC approach is illustrated by the graphs in Figure 2a and Figure
2b, with Figure 2a showing the case where 30% of individuals in a dog
species has dysfunctional hips, and Figure 2b showing a case of healthy
populations where there are no cases of CHF. (Note that due to the
difficulty representing a three-dimensional figure here, I graph the negative
consequences of a given level of functioning as a second Y-axis. Prevalence
of a level of functioning is shown by the solid line, with magnitudes labeled
14. I am grateful to one of the anonymous referees of Philosophy of Science, who
made a suggestion that was crucial to my choosing this way of combining facts about
negative consequences and prevalence.
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Figure 2. a. Prevalence and negative consequences of canine hip functioning. b. Prev-
alance and negative consequences of EF in healthy population.
on the left side of the graph, while severity of negative consequences is
indicated by a dotted line, with magnitudes labeled on the right side of
the graph.)
To flesh out the way that negative consequences come into play in cases
like this, consider the following thought experiment. Imagine that there
are two areas of the human brain—areas “A1” and “A2”—that are in-
volved in motor coordination. Imagine that all people lose cells in both
areas every year, with some people losing more and some less, and the
capacity of A1 or A2 is directly proportional to the number of cells
currently present in that area at a given time. Assume that in any age
group, there is a statistically normal distribution in the number of cells
and thus the capabilities of the area. Finally, imagine that in the reference
class of 70-year-old men, those whose A1 functions in the lowest 30%
have symptoms of moderate Parkinson’s disease, while only those whose
A2 functions in the lowest 2% show such symptoms.15
15. The loss of cells in the substantia nigra during the development of Parkinson’s
disease is roughly similar to the sort of process I am imagining for the development
of pathology in areas A1 and A2.
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It seems clear that the lowest functioning 30% of A1’s will count as
dysfunctional, while just the lowest 2% of A2’s will be so classified. Bi-
ologists—and doctors and medical scientists, in this case, since the species
is Homo sapiens—would respond to the presence of the symptoms by
looking for a cause. When it is found to be the low level of functioning
in A1 or A2, these levels would be judged dysfunctional, i.e., the lowest
30% in A1 and the lowest 2% in A2. For individuals with an A2 func-
tioning at a level above 2%, there would be no temptation to count the
area as dysfunctioning.
6.2. Specifications. Making FNC work requires specifying carefully
how consequences are evaluated and quantified. One approach that def-
initely does not work is to count only reductions in ability to survive and
reproduce. Interestingly, some critics mistakenly attribute a position like
this to Boorse, overlooking his comments favoring the Frequency ap-
proach. Wakefield, for example, writes that for Boorse, “a disorder is a
condition that reduces longevity or fertility” (1992a, 378). Although these
critics are wrong to attribute the position to Boorse, they’re right to attack
it. The main problem is that dysfunctions don’t necessarily reduce survival
or reproduction at all. If an individual has aphasia, i.e., an inability to
speak (Wakefield’s example [1999a, 379]), or blindness, or, for that matter,
is missing a limb, he won’t necessarily have lowered expected survival or
reproduction if he lives in a society that is suitably supportive. As Boorse
points out, in certain settings a disease may even improve survival and
reproduction, as when flat feet keep a recruit out of the army (1977, 545).
Any measure of “negative consequences” needs to be more fine-grained
and contextual than just looking at effects on survival and reproduction.
We also have to avoid making “negative consequences” too broad. For
example, if negative consequences were entirely in the eyes of the be-
holder—including any effect that has negative valence to the individual—
then the problem of healthy populations would immediately be regener-
ated for FNC. If some individual with EF 50% cares deeply about having
a higher numerical value of his EF—due to vanity, for instance, or due
to a desire to carry out some unusual activity that it would allow—then
that individual would again count as having a dysfunctioning heart.
Instead, the relevant negative consequences should be those that impact
some standard activity or capacity of the organism. More precisely, they
should be effects that significantly diminish the ability of a part or process
in the organism, or of the overall organism, to carry out an activity that
is generally standard in the species and has been for a long period of time.
In most cases, and perhaps all (I cannot settle this fine point here), this
will be an activity or capacity that has been subject to the process of
natural selection in the species. Classic cases of dysfunction—such as
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aphasia, blindness, deafness, or flat feet—all represent significant de-
creases in the organism-level capacities of speaking, seeing, hearing, and
running, respectively, whether or not there is any effect on survival and
reproduction. A person who is blind due to chemical damage to his cor-
neas for instance, has a level of functioning of the visual system that falls
significantly below that which has been standard in humans for eons, and
was certainly the product of natural selection acting on humans and their
ancestors.
6.3. Problems of Including Too Much. With the FNC account specified
in this way, possible attacks can come from two directions, i.e., charging
that it includes too many conditions as dysfunctions or too few. An attack
of the first sort might claim that FNC account counts some undesirable
but normal conditions as dysfunctions. Take normal aging, for instance.
According to the Frequency approach, the standard changes of aging are
not dysfunctions, since they are so common. But since the FNC account
factors in negative consequences—making it possible that common states
can count as dysfunctional—there is at least the danger that the unde-
sirable effects of aging could cause the line between low-normal and dys-
function to slide far enough to the right to classify some of normal aging
as dysfunction.
This attack makes most sense as a claim that the FNC account will
count the normal process of aging, rather than an effect, as dysfunctional,
since although the process of aging is generally considered normal, the
process can lead to the creation of dysfunctional states. For example, if
a person has an already reduced EF—due to previous damage, such as
in Mr. Smith’s initial heart attack—it is possible that normal aging could
reduce the EF further and set off congestive heart failure. For this reason,
an attack on the FNC account should focus on the danger that this
approach will classify the normal aging process as dysfunctional.
But the attack is not concerning, for a number of reasons. First, in
some people the process of aging may reflect dysfunction, e.g., if it is
unusually rapid, as in the disease progeria. So classifying the process as
dysfunctional in some people may not be mistaken. Second, even though
typical aging may be “natural” in some sense, current evolutionary the-
ories suggest that it does not reflect the proper functioning of any part
or process in the body (Caplan 2004), and thus there is no danger that
the process in a particular person could represent dysfunction. According
to these theories, natural selection favored processes that allow individuals
to reproduce rapidly, with these same processes causing senescence when
they continue after reproduction is over. Thus, aging after reproduction
would have no function according to etiological or nonetiological ac-
counts. In fact, these biological theories have led some to argue that
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“normal” aging is a form of disease, albeit a universal one (Caplan 2004).
For all these reasons, an attack on the FNC account involving its inter-
pretation of normal aging should not give us pause.
6.4. Problems with Including Too Little. The second type of attack on
the FNC approach could claim that its requirement that there be negative
consequences leads to its classifying too few conditions as dysfunctional.
The common cold or hay fever, for instance, are well-recognized diseases,
and thus, according to DR accounts, they must involve dysfunction. But
their negative consequences may be thought to be too minimal to satisfy
the FNC’s requirement.16
I believe that the FNC can easily handle such cases. First, the negative
consequences of these conditions on respiration (and the normal func-
tioning of nasal mucosa, for instance) are significant enough to satisfy
FNC’s requirements. A stuffy nose may not cause a reduction in survival
and reproduction, but Section 6.2 (above) showed that such effects are
not necessary in order for consequences to count as significant. People
with serious hayfever may have a greatly reduced ability to moisen and
warm air being inhaled through their nose, for instance.
Second, even if the consequences were quite minor, it would be more
of a problem for the DR approach to disease than for the FNC account
of dysfunction. Many mild conditions commonly classified as diseases do
not involve any clear dysfunction, a problem that has been raised for DR
accounts (Schwartz 2007). Lastly, given the prevalence of hay fever in the
American population currently, this condition may pose a more serious
attack on a DR account of disease adopting the Frequency approach than
one adopting the FNC approach.
A greater challenge to the FNC account stems from cases where a clear
dysfunction has no negative consequences at all, i.e., truly asymptomatic
conditions. Both Boorse and Wakefield discuss such conditions, defending
their focus on dysfunction rather than negative consequences in defining
disease.17 Boorse mentions that large numbers of liver cells can be dys-
functional without there being any impact on the liver’s overall function
(1987, 371–372, quoted in Section 5.2, above). Wakefield discusses a case
where a small number of sperm are dysfunctional, unable to swim towards
the egg, although there are enough other functional sperm so that there
is no overall decrease in fertility (Wakefield 1999a, 376).
Note that these cases are similar in that they are both ones where there
16. I am thankful to an anonymous referee at Philosophy of Science for raising this
concern.
17. Once again, I am thankful to an anonymous referee at Philosophy of Science for
emphasizing the importance of addressing this sort of case.
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is such excess capacity that that the dysfunction of a part (or a number
of cells) has no noticeable impact on the whole. I will argue that such
cases are properly understood as ones where the overall organ or group
of cells is functioning properly, even if a part is dysfunctioning, and I will
show that the FNC approach can yield this result.
Focusing on Boorse’s case of the asymptomatic liver condition, three
different ways of specifying the case appear to make an important dif-
ference in its implications. First imagine that a number of liver cells have
died, as part of a process that is completely standard in humans, perhaps
due to apoptosis. In this case, there’s no question whether these cells are
functioning or dysfunctioning, since they are dead, and there is little at-
traction to thinking that the overall liver is functioning abnormally, since
the loss of these cells is typical. The FNC account would concur.
Second, imagine that instead of the cells dying, they have just lost most
of their ability to carry out a certain detoxification process. Continue to
assume it is typical for a small percentage of liver cells to lose this ability
in individuals in the reference class. In this case, I believe there would be
little attraction to concluding that the liver or the cells are dysfunctioning,
and scientists may disagree about how to classify the individual cells. In
the end, I believe, this case would not be helpful for testing the FNC
theory, due to uncertainty about whether the individual cells are dys-
functioning or not.
Finally, imagine that these cells’ decreased ability is unusual: assume
that the loss of ability occurs in only 2% of individuals in the reference
class, perhaps due to some virus. In this case more than the last, I believe,
there is some attraction to thinking that the individual cells are dysfunc-
tional, even though the overall liver is not, and the FNC should be ex-
pected to come to the same conclusion. Note that even if it did not, this
would form a relatively weak objection to the FNC since it’s based on
such a specific and unusual case, where our intuitions about the “right”
answer are somewhat less reliable.18
But, on closer examination, the FNC gets the right answer. The cells
are functioning at a level that is unusual in the reference class, so they
satisfy the “frequency” part of the FNC’s requirements. And, I would
argue, the loss has a significant negative consequence as well according
to the specifications presented above for how such consequences should
be evaluated (Section 5.2). The negative consequence is the cells’ inability
18. Here I am following the typical procedure in “conceptual analysis,” checking pro-
posed theories by their ability to conform to intuitions about the “correct” interpre-
tation of a case. I have significant qualms about this general project, as do others,
especially involving imaginary cases where “intuitions” are questionable (cf. Ramsey
1992; Schwartz 2004, 2007). See further discussion in Section 7 below.
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to do something that has been standard for liver cells to do in individuals
in this reference class for thousands of years. Just as in human blindness
the eyes’ loss of ability to see counts as a negative consequence whether
or not this loss has an effect on survival and reproduction, so these liver
cells’ loss of ability to carry out the usual detoxification should count as
a negative consequence even though there is no effect on the liver overall.
Similar considerations apply to the case of the few dysfunctional sperm
that Wakefield discusses.
In fact, cases like this can be slightly tweaked to form a challenge to
the Frequency approach, since they regenerate the problem of healthy
populations. Imagine that all liver cells in the reference class carry out
the detoxification process at 80% of capacity or above; i.e., none are
dysfunctioning. According to the Frequency approach, however, the bot-
tom 2% or so (assuming normal distribution) would count as dysfunc-
tional. The FNC account does not necessitate this outcome, since it allows
for the relevance of a judgment that carrying out the detoxification process
at 80% of capacity does not represent a significant decrement. Admittedly,
there is some ambiguity how to define “significant” in these settings, but
this may be unavoidable.
7. Conclusion. The FNC account, like the Frequency approach before it,
does not provide an algorithm for drawing a specific line between low-
normal function and dysfunction. There will always be some arbitrariness.
But, the FNC account explains how to combine two factors—frequency
and negative consequences, as specified above—to draw an acceptable
line in many cases. This approach is superior to the Frequency approach,
I believe, for the reasons described above. Which approach is chosen—
one of these, or some other—is less important than recognizing and con-
fronting the line-drawing problem. Failing to do so is a serious lacuna
for any definition of function or dysfunction.
Philosophical analyses of concepts such as “dysfunction,” “function,”
and “disease” are often framed as attempts at conceptual analysis, with
the aim of uncovering the true meaning of a term (Boorse 1976) or the
“criteria of application that people generally have in mind” (Neander
1991, 171). But these ways of defining the project rest on problematic
assumptions about the nature of meaning (Millikan 1989) or the sort of
criteria that speakers generally apply (Ramsey 1992). There is little ques-
tion that in attempting to clarify and define concepts, we change them
(Schwartz 2004, 2007). In this spirit, I believe that the FNC account should
be evaluated as a possible approach for addressing the line-drawing prob-
lem in the future, rather than as describing how people have addressed
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the line-drawing problem in the past.19 (That said, I believe the FNC
account does capture elements that are relevant to many experts’ thoughts
in this area.) The approach’s availability for use in the future, and its
success at matching current judgments in many cases, should help ease
worries that drawing a line between functioning and dysfunctioning in-
evitably relies on problematic teleological assumptions or value
judgments.
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